Intrinsic Motivation and the Design of Contracts

I am applying for 6 months funding to visit Columbia Business School, in the research group of Prof. Stephan Meier. The projects that I plan to undertake during my stay at Columbia Business School are part of a bigger research agenda on how employers can use non-monetary incentives to influence the intrinsic motivation of their workers. During my staying, I intend to conduct both empirical/experimental and theoretical research. In my empirical and experimental research I want to test if employers use non-monetary incentives as a substitute for non-monetary incentives to motivate effort provision. To do so, I plan to bring my current laboratory experiment to the field, and to analyse empirical data on Corporate Social Responsibility. Furthermore, in a laboratory experiment, I plan to study how non-monetary can reduce the need for monitoring and control. Theoretically, I want to study how to optimally design compensation packages when employers have two instruments , one monetary (a piece rate) and one non-monetary (the choice of the job mission), to extract effort from the workers. Stephan Meier is one of the world's experts in designing field and lab experiments related to labor contracts. I, therefore, look forward to receive his feedback and guidance on the experimental projects. In addition to Prof. Meier, there are several other leading scholarsin the fields of contract and organizational theory at Columbia, who couldoffer advice and guidance for my theoretical research.