Necessary Being. The Ontological Argument and the Metaphysics of Modality

In describing the world we inhabit, we mundanely and scientifically make modal claims and employ modal notions. We take it that history could have gone otherwise or that people could have not been born. If we were right, such facts would only contingently obtain. But then, we take it that mathematical truths and everything subject to the laws of nature couldn’t have gone otherwise. If we were right, these facts would obtain necessarily. Regardless of whether we’re right about specific modal claims, the question inevitably arises: by virtue of what do certain facts obtain necessarily while others don’t? - The systematic investigation of these questions pertains to the metaphysics of modality. Within this field, this project aims to provide an answer to such questions by offering a philosophical account of what makes something’s existence necessary. The project thus focuses on the modality of existence.To achieve this aim, the project brings insights into and from the history of philosophy to bear on contemporary debates in the metaphysics of modality, while enriching the systematical assessment of big historical figures by sensitivity to current issues in modal logic and metaphysics. The project’s goal is to articulate an integrated view, encompassing both a metaphysical account of what necessary existence consists in, and an epistemological account of how necessary existence can be known. The philosophies of Descartes, Kant, and Hegel are examined and their pertinence to contemporary metaphysical discussions are exhibited in this project. Its results are going to enrich contemporary metaphysical debates, not least by articulating a novel account of necessary existence - necessary contingentism - drawing heavily on Hegel’s metaphysics, and defending it against rival proposals. Central to necessary contingentism is the claim that what is possible depends on what is actual: something’s possibility is grounded a set of actual entities and relations of relative necessity holding between them. Accordingly, possibilities become actual upon processes being triggered in virtue of these relations. Thusly, necessary contingentism avoids postulating non-actual entities to explain metaphysical possibility and necessity. Necessary contingentism therefore enables subjects to stand in causal relations to all possible and necessary states of affairs. As most of our evidence-gathering practices, such as perception or empirical observation, rely on such causal relations, this account bears significant epistemic advantages over extant theories.Methodologically, the project follows well-established standards of philosophical argumentation: it relies on clear definitions and the logical analysis of arguments to ensure highest standards of coherence and validity. Particularly, the logics and semantics of modality provide an invaluable formal tool of analysis for this project. In interpreting classical texts, the project relies on historical research and critical editions, while at the same time pursuing systematic aims.