To AB or Not to AB? Dispute Settlement in WTO Reform

Bernard M. Hoekman, Petros C. Mavroidis

Research output: Contribution to journalReview articlepeer-review

22 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Recent debates on the operation of the World Trade Organization's dispute resolution mechanism have focused primarily on the appellate body. We argue that this neglects the first-order issue confronting the rules-based trading system: sustaining the principle of depoliticized conflict resolution that is reflected in the negative consensus rule for the adoption of dispute settlement findings. Improving the quality of the work of panels by appointing a roster of full-time professional adjudicators, complemented by reforms to World Trade Organization working practices that reduce incentives to resort to formal dispute settlement, can resolve the main issues that led to the appellate body crisis. Effective, coherent, and consistent World Trade Organization dispute resolution need not include an appellate body. An appropriately redesigned single-stage process can serve just as well, if not better.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)703-722
Number of pages20
JournalJournal of International Economic Law
Volume23
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2020

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2020 The Author(s) 2020. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com.

ASJC Scopus Subject Areas

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous)
  • Law

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