Why do countries with criminal antitrust sanctions fail to incarcerate price fixers?

Terry Calvani, Rory Jones

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

A good many jurisdictions have criminalized cartel conduct and authorized custodial sentences for offenders in efforts to enhance antitrust enforcement. The authors explore why so few of those jurisdictions have imposed prison sentences on cartelists. Although data problems lead to understating the number of incarcerations, the record is not robust. The authors find that the reasons are varied. Statutory impediments and poor case selection are important factors. Others include poor case management, separation of investigation and prosecutorial responsibilities and judicial reluctance to impose sentences on ‘white collar’ criminals. In addition, lack of public support and cultural differences in sentencing in general also probably play roles.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)438-478
Number of pages41
JournalJournal of Antitrust Enforcement
Volume12
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Nov 1 2024

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© The Author(s) 2024.

ASJC Scopus Subject Areas

  • Law

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