RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

Elizabeth A. Gordon, Elaine Henry, Darius Palia

Producción científica

120 Citas (Scopus)

Resumen

Transactions between a firm and its own managers, directors, principal owners or affiliates are known as related party transactions. Such transactions, which are diverse and often complex, represent a corporate governance challenge. This paper initiates research in finance on related party transactions, which have implications for agency literature. We first explore two alternative perspectives of related party transactions: the view that such transactions are conflicts of interest which compromise management's agency responsibility to shareholders as well as directors' monitoring functions; and the view that such transactions are efficient transactions that fulfill rational economic demands of a firm such as the need for service providers with in-depth firm-specific knowledge. We describe related party transactions for a sample of 112 publicly-traded companies, including the types of transactions and parties involved. This paper provides a starting point in related party transactions research.

Idioma originalEnglish
Título de la publicación alojadaCorporate Governance
EditorialJAI Press
Páginas1-27
Número de páginas27
ISBN (versión impresa)0762311339, 9780762311330
DOI
EstadoPublished - 2004

Serie de la publicación

NombreAdvances in Financial Economics
Volumen9
ISSN (versión impresa)1569-3732

Financiación

FinanciadoresNúmero del financiador
Rutgers Business School Research Resources Fund

    ASJC Scopus Subject Areas

    • Accounting
    • Finance
    • Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous)

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