TY - JOUR
T1 - State Capitalism in the GATT/WTO Legal Order
AU - Mavroidis, Petros C.
AU - Sapir, André
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2023 Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.
PY - 2023/3
Y1 - 2023/3
N2 - Originally, the multilateral trading regime did not address state capitalism in a comprehensive manner, since none of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade founders had espoused this form of economic governance. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade did contain specific provisions dealing with state trading and with subsidies, but nothing more. This situation has remained unchanged over the years, except for tightening the screws in areas already regulated (like subsidies), even though the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization membership has become more and more heterogenous, with some members being overtly state capitalists. This was the case because these new members were either too small to really matter (e.g. Hungary) or because it was hoped that bigger players would transform into market economies (e.g. China). In hindsight, this has proved to be a grave error, since many of the difficulties that the world trading system currently faces originate in the unsatisfactory disciplining of state intervention in the workings of the economy of World Trade Organization members.
AB - Originally, the multilateral trading regime did not address state capitalism in a comprehensive manner, since none of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade founders had espoused this form of economic governance. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade did contain specific provisions dealing with state trading and with subsidies, but nothing more. This situation has remained unchanged over the years, except for tightening the screws in areas already regulated (like subsidies), even though the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization membership has become more and more heterogenous, with some members being overtly state capitalists. This was the case because these new members were either too small to really matter (e.g. Hungary) or because it was hoped that bigger players would transform into market economies (e.g. China). In hindsight, this has proved to be a grave error, since many of the difficulties that the world trading system currently faces originate in the unsatisfactory disciplining of state intervention in the workings of the economy of World Trade Organization members.
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U2 - 10.1093/jiel/jgad001
DO - 10.1093/jiel/jgad001
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85187335078
SN - 1369-3034
VL - 26
SP - 154
EP - 165
JO - Journal of International Economic Law
JF - Journal of International Economic Law
IS - 1
ER -